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LIABILITY FOR INJURIES DONE BY BLASTING
WITHOUT PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE.
The case of Turner v. The Degnon McLean Contracting
Company, reported in 90 N. Y. Sup. 948 and decided December 9, 19o4, presents not only one of the latest decisions
on this subject but one of the broadest. The facts of the
case were that the plaintiff, while lawfully walking along
Forty-second Street in the City of New York, was struck
by a piece of rock and injured. The rock was thrown out
of the New York Subway excavations by the blasting of
defendants, who were employed on the work as subcontractors. The plaintiff sued in trespass and on the trial defendant offered to prove that all care had been used in the
42
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blasting, but the court refused to admit the evidence, holding
that it was immaterial, as the action was not for negligence
but for the injuries resulting from defendants' trespass.
The evidence was subsequently admitted under the general
issue to show that the defendants had not caused the injury.
The jury found, however, that the stone was thrown by the
defendants' blast and that it caused the injury to plaintiff
and brought in a verdict for the plaintiff.
On appeal the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
affirmed the lower court, holding in substance, first, that a
party blasting on the public highway or on private property
is liable for injury done by casting rocks or dirt on neighboring property without negligence being shown, because
his entry on the property is a trespass and unlawful and he
is therefore liable whether it was done negligently or not;
second, that the casting of stone or dirt by blasting from a
private property onto the public highway is an unlawful
entry on the public property and the party is liable for the
injuries that may result without negligence being shown;
and third, that a party working under the authority of the
city on the highway has a right in only so much of the
highway as his charter allows him and any casting of rocks
or dirt by blasting beyond his right in the highway into any
other part of the highway in the possession of the public
is an unlawful entry and he is liable for all injuries that may
result. The opinion was delivered by O'Brien J. and Van
Brunt P. J. and Patterson J. concurred.
Laughlin J. wrote a dissenting opinion in which Hatch
J. concurred. The dissent was on the principle that the
technicality of a trespass did not exist in this case, as the
defendants had a right in the street under the city and the
city was in possession of all the streets, wherefore the defendants could not be guilty of an unlawful entry into that
which they had a right of entry granted by the proper
authority, and that plaintiff's only right of action lay in
negligence.
From a legal standpoint we have here a conflict of principles. On the one hand the contractor was only pursuing
his lawful business as authorized by the city, and where one

INJURIES DONE BY BLASTING.

679

in his lawful business causes without negligence and unavoidably an injury, it is damnum absque injuria. On the
other hand, one of the oldest maxims of the law is "sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas," and as Judge Gardiner said in
Hay v. Cohoes:
"If these rights conflict, the former must yield to the latter, as the
more important of the two, since upon grounds of public policy, it is
better that one man should surender a particular use of his land,
than that another should be deprived of the beneficial use of his
property altogether."

The leading case in New York on this subject is that of
Hay v. Cohoes, 2 N. Y. 159, decided in 1849. It was a
case where a girl, walking along a public highway, was
a part of the Erie Canal and in doing this, they threw some
dirt and stone on plaintiff's land by blasting. No negligence was shown, and the court held that it was not necessary as the action lay on defendant's injury to plaintiff's
land. The court continues:
"He may excavate a canal but he cannot cast the dirt or stones upon
the land of his neighbor, either by human agency or the force of gunpowder. If he cannot construct the work without the adoption of such
means, he must abandon that mode of using his property or be held
responsible for all damages resulting therefrom."

In 1874 the case of St. Peter v. Denison, 58 N. Y. 416,
was decided. In this case the plaintiff was working in a
field adjoining the Erie Canal when he was struck by a piece
of frozen dirt from a blast made by the defendant and he
sued in trespass for the injury. The court on appeal said:
" It follows, then, that the defendant having no right to invade the
premises, which, for the purposes of this case, were in the possession
of the plaintiff, it matters not whether or no he made his invasion
without negligence."

This extends the rule of Hay v. Cohoes to cover personal
injuries and bases the recovery on the defendant's trespass
on plaintiff's property as a wrongful act.
The next extension of the rule appears in Sullivan v.
Dunham, i6I N. Y. 29o, decided in i9OO, which was a
case where a girl, walking along a public highway, was
struck by a piece of a tree stump, which defendant was
blasting out of his land. The court held as follows:
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"We think the courts below were right in holding the defendants
liable as trespassers, regardless of the care they may have used in doing
the work. Their action was a direct invasion of the rights of the
person injured, who was lawfully in a public highway, which was a
safe place until they made it otherwise by throwing into it the section
of a tree."

In summing up the benefits of this rule, Judge Vann
says:
"It renders the enjoyment of all property mori secure by preventing
such a use of one piece by one man as may injure all his neighbors.
It makes human life safer by tending to prevent a land-owner from
casting, either with or without negligence, a part of his land upon the
person of one who is where he has a right to be. It so applies the
maxim of sic utere tuo as to protect persons and property from direct
physical invasion, which, though accidental, has the same effect as
if it were intentional. It lessens the hardship by placing absolute
liability upon the one who causes the injury."

In view of this extension of the rule made by Sullivan v.
Dunham the majority opinion in the principal case seems
justified in holding that defendants' right to excavate in
part of the street was no defence in trespass for his casting
stone into another part of'the street which was not within
his occupation, as was argued by the dissenting judges. If
such a technicality were allowed as a defence, he might
escape liability even if he cast a stone a mile, so long as
it landed in the city's street, for the public has no greater
right in a street a mile distant, than in the one defendants
were excavating. The defendants undoubtedly had no
more right in the part of the street open to the public than
any other citizen or than if the subway they were digging
was their own private property, situate next the public
highway.
Although the case of Hay v. Cohoes seems to apply the
rule of sic utere tuo, generally, yet the N. Y. rule is in truth
limited to where there has been an invasion of property or
technical trespass. Thus in Benner v. Atlantic Dredging
Co., 134 N. Y. 156, and in Booth v. R. R., 14o N. Y. 267,
it was held that the rule of Hay v. Cohoes did not apply to
cases where the injury was not the result of any entry or
trespass on the land of another but was caused by shock
and concussion resulting from defendant's blasting.
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Recovery may be had for injuries also where the blasting
is a nuisance, but the courts will not recognize it as a nuisance where it is done in a reasonably safe place,.or is authorized by the municipality, and therefore cases like the principal case will not be covered by that rule. The Supreme
Court of Alabama in the case of Kinney v. Koopman, decided in -1897 and reported in 37 L. Rep. A., suggests a
rather interesting theory in this respect. The court said
the keeping of a powder magazine is not ipso facto a nuisance (unless made so by law), for magazines exist in the
thousands and yet there is scarcely a well-authenticated
instance of spontaneous combustion. It is likewise not
ipso facto a nuisance to keep a vicious dog well chained or
a wild beast well caged, as in the zo6logical institutions,
but if they escape the owner is undoubtedly liable. It is not
the keeping, therefore, but the escape that constitutes the
nuisance. In this case the court did not have to apply the
theory, as the magazine in question was forbidden by law
and a nuisance ipso facto.
The rule of liability for injury done by vicious or wild
animals may be explained as suggested by the Alabama
Court on the grounds of a nuisance or on the rule as laid
down in Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R- 3 H. of L. 330, which
holds that where one for his own purposes brings upon his
land, collects and keeps there, anything likely to do mischief
if it escapes, such a person becomes an insurer and is prima
facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence.of an escape. This rule laid down in Rylands
v. Fletcher was applied to a case where the defendant purchased a property and built a reservoir on it, employing the
most intelligent and skilful engineers, but the water escaped
and injured the plaintiff. The escape of the water was due
to certain old mine-shafts and tunnels which had been filled
up long before defendant purchased the property and of
the existence of which he was ignorant. The same principle of insurance against all damage is applied to cases
where the owner brings filth on his land. The American
& English Encyclopedia of Law, Vol. 2L, p. 699, classes
these cases among the nuisances and says:
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"One who collects filthy or offensive matter upon his premises,
which by being carried by rain along the surface of the ground, or by
percolation through the soil, injures an adjoining owner by polluting
a well, is liable for the maintenance of a nuisance. . . This liability
has been held .to attach apart from any question of negligence."

We have, therefore, three distinct theories on which a
person blasting is liable without proof of negligence: First,
That the defendant in blasting is conducting a nuisance,
but this only applies under the circumstances previously
mentioned; second, that the throwing of dirt and stones as
a result of blasting on the land of another or on the highway

is a technical trespass; this is the New York rule; third,
that a person blasting becomes an insurer against any injury
which may result because of the intrinsic danger in all
blasting.
The first or nuisance rule gives a remedy in all cases
to which it may be applied, but is limited in its application.
The second or New York rule gives a remedy only where
there has been an entry or trespass. The third rule, however, is both general in its remedy and its application.
Outside of New York the question of recovery without
proof of negligence does not appear to have been raised as
often as one would have expected. In Indiana the case of
Wright v. Compton, 53 Ind. 337, decided in i876, met the
question squarely. The plaintiff was struck by a piece of
rock from a quarry while walking on the highway. The
court on appeal said:
"The question involved is not one of negligence on the part of the
defendants. The act charged against them is, in itself, unlawful-not
the act of blasting and quarrying rock, but the act of casting fragments of rock upon the plaintiff to his injury. When the act, in itself,
is unlawful, it is immaterial whether it is done ignorantly, negligently,
or purposely, except in the measure of damages. Every person must
so use his property and exercise his rights as not to injure the property or restrict the rights of others. . . .The public travel must not
be endangered to accommodate the private rights of an individual."

Carmen v. R. R., 4 Ohio 399, decided in 1854, and Tiffin
v. McCormick, 34 Ohio 642, decided in 1878, were both
cases where the defendants, while lawfully blasting, injured
the plaintiff's lands by casting dirt and stones upon them,
and in both cases the court held that the trespass was not
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justified either by the state's permit or by proof that the
defendant had used all possible care.
The cases of Whitehouse v. R. R., 52 Me. 208; Sabin v.
R. R., 25"Vt. 363; and Brown v. R. R., 5 Gray (Mass.)
35, all held that a railroad's charter of eminent domain
allowed them the right to blast, and if unavoidable to throw
stones and dirt on the adjoining land, but that they were
liable for all damage they might do, whether the blasting
was negligent or not, for such damage was the same as the
taking of the land to build the road on.
The rule as laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher, that a person bringing a dangerous thing upon his land becomes an
insurer against all injury, has been criticised in both England and America. But the objection has been rather to
the application of the rule to the facts, and in England its
application has been restricted to cases where the "thing"
is intrinsically dangerous. And this is also true of the
American cases which are quoted as having refused to accept
the case. Thus in Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, where
a boiler exploded without negligence on the defendant's
part and injured the plaintiff, the court discussed and overruled the theory of Rylands v. Fletcher as bad law. Yet
in that same jurisdiction the owner of a wild or dangerous
animal is liable for any injury it may do if it escapes and
one who deposits filth on his land is liable if some of it
washes or percolates into his neighbor's well. Swett v.
Cutts, 5o N. H. 439; Marshall v. Wellwood, 38 N. J. I
339, and Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 153, also refuse it,
and in Everett v. Tunnel Co., 23 Cal. 235, a contrary decision was reached on almost the same facts as in Rylands v.
Fletcher, though the case was not cited.
On the other hand Rylands v. Fletcher has been cited
with approval in a number of cases, but only Illinois and
Ohio have expressly applied the rule to blasting cases. The
Fitz Simmons Co. v. Brown, I99 Ill. 39o, decided in I9o2,
was a case where the defendant was employed by the city
to lay a water main 7o feet below the ground and while
working under plaintiff's premises injured one of his buildings by shock and concussion. The court held that the rule
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of sic utere tuo applied whether there was an entry or not
for
"One who makes use of an explosive in the ground near the property of another, when the natural and probable, though not inevitable,
result of the explosion is injury to such property of the other, is liable
for the resulting injury, however high a degree of care or skill may
have been exercised in making use of the explosive."

The same decision was given again in 19o4 in the case of

The City of Chicago v. Murdock, 212 Ill. 9.
In Glycerine Co. v. St. Mary Mfg. Co., 6o Ohio 56o,
decided in I899, the plaintiff was injured by the explosion
of the defendant's glycerine magazine a mile distant.

The

magazine was built with all care, was not in violation of any
law, and exploded without negligence. The court held the
defendants liable as insurers, saying:
" Is one who brings upon his own premises such a dangerous agency
liable for damages caused by its exploding, although such owner is
not chargeable with either want of care or an unlawful act in connection with the casualty?

. . . We are of the opinion that the storing

of nitroglycerine should be deemed to be an extraordinary and unusual
use of property, and we can see no principle upon which an exception
to the general doctrine laid down in Fletcher v. Rylands, supra, can
be held to exist in favor of one who stgres .upon his own premises
that or any other dangerous explosive."

: In the case of Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, decided
in 1886, the court lays down the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher
as applying to blasting cases but also says that the plaintiff
can recover without it, as the defendant's blasting was a
nuisance per se. Also in the cases of Cahill v. Eastman,
18 Minn. 324, decided in 1872, and Cork v. Blossom, 162

Mass. 330, the courts have applied the rule to facts similar
to those of Rylands v. Fletcher.
A good reason for upholding this rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher is suggested by Bigelow in his "Leading Cases on
Torts," p. 503, where he says, referring to the cases supporting the rule:
"The above view of the liabilities of parties who bring upon their
lands dangerous things, makes the defendant in effect an insurer:
and why should he not be? The plaintiff pays the premium of parting
with something of the security to life and property which he previously
enjoyed, in order that the defendant may carry on a prosperous busi-
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ness. It matters not that the premium is paid under compulsion; the
defendant should be required to take the risk as much as if the
payment were made upon consent and as the express consideration
of the assumpsit of the risk. The plaintiff's detriment is the price
of the defendant's business. It is more than this: it is essential to
it: and the defendant should therefore either restore the premium
by removing the dangerous thing, or be required to make good the
destruction done by it."

This reasoning of Judge Bigelow is unanswerable, and
there is no reason why the courts which do not approve of
Rylands v. Fletcher on its facts, should not simply limit its
doctrine to what they deem intrinsically dangerous subjects.
Some courts have done this, others have endorsed Rylands
v. Fletcher outright. New York, as was said before, expressly disapproves it, but when we look at this questionable
theory of trespass in blasting cases which they have developed, it is apparent that it is an attempt to accomplish the
same end under the guise of a pure technicality, although
as was above shown, even in New York they have refused
to go any further and hold a person blasting liable for consequential damages when there was no technical trespass.
In Pennsylvania the cases on blasting accidents seem to
have received little attention, and it is hard to say what
rule the courts would follow if the principal case came up
for decision. In Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164, decided in
1889, the court found that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, but Mr. Justice Mitchell, in delivering
the opinion of the court, says:
"The plaintiff was not struck by anything. The sole cause alleged
was the noise and concussion of the explosion."

From this dictum one might argue that if the question
involved a physical entry, it would be a different problem.
In Tuckackinsky v. Coal Co., I99 Pa. 515, decided in i9Ol,
the court, however, swings entirely to the other extreme.
It was a case where a powder magazine at the mouth of a
colliery exploded, damaging the plaintiff, who lived at a
distance of 700 feet and who had lived there for 16 years.
The court held that this was no nuisance because the plaintiff had lived there for so many years without complaint or
injury and then continues:
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"Such materials are always dangerous, but as their use is essential
to the work of mining, it is impossible to protect, absolutely, persons
or property in the immediate vicinity. The risk is similar to that arising from the operation of steam boilers, and other machinery and
apparatus necessary to the prosperity of great communities."

The courts of Pennsylvania are greatly influenced in their
decisions by what is "necessary to the prosperity of great
communities," as may be seen in Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113
Pa. 126, and in Robb v. Carnegie Bos., i45 Pa. 345- - Yet
in a case of a well pollution by percolation from a neighboring privy, the court said:
"The plea of necessity fails to justify an act of this kind; for the

proposition that one man should under any circumstances be permitted
to deposit any part of his health-destroying filth in or upon his neighbor's premises, is simply absurd."

Haugh's App. 1O2 Pa. 42, and also in Gas Co. v. Murphy,
39 Pa. 257.
In the jurisdictions not cited above, blasting cases have
occurred, but the question has not been brought up whether
the plaintiff may recover in trespass for an injury without
proof of negligence. In many of the cases the plaintiff
sued and recovered in an action on the case on the ground of
negligence; in others the courts have implied neghgence;
but whatever the method the plaintiff has been generally
allowed to recover unless he was himself negligent. What
these jurisdictions would decide if the question were
squarely raised is difficult to say. They would be probably
governed largely by what they considered the public policy
of the problem. A court deciding this question for the first
time has great power, and in considering what is for the
benefit of the community they should remember that statute
forbidding gas companies from depositing their waste in
rivers. This at first appeared most unpolitic, and for a
time it looked as if the gas companies would have to stop
their business through their inability to dispose of their
waste. • The most renowned chemists were employed, and
to-day that same "waste" is almost of equal value with the
gas produced.
Henry P. Erdman.

